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Why Behavioural Economics 
Will Not Save the World
Anand Shrivastava
Behavioural economics is widely 
considered to be a signifi cant 
break from standard economic 
modelling. What is different 
about the behavioural economics 
approach? Is it as revolutionary as 
we are led to believe? What else 
does research in this fi eld offer?
The award of this year’s Nobel Memo rial Prize in Economic Sci-ences to Richard Thaler has brought 
renewed attention to the fi eld of behav-
ioural economics.1 Four earlier Nobels 
have been given to scholars who have 
integrated insights about human beha-
viour from psychology into economics: 
Herbert A Simon (1978), Maurice Allais 
(1988), Daniel Kahneman (2002) and 
Robert Shiller, Eugene F Fama and Lars 
Peter Hansen (2013). This shows that 
there is a recognition within the discipline 
of the contribution that the behavioural 
approach has made to the understanding 
of economic ph enomena. However, the 
extent of this contribution is often exag-
gerated, and behavioural economics is 
presented as the panacea that will cure 
economics of all its problems.
In this article, I describe how the 
behavioural approach is different from 
standard economic models and then 
argue that, while the shortcomings of the 
standard models pointed out by this 
 approach are important, the models that 
are offered as alternatives do not depart 
from the standard ones in any funda-
mental way. Many of the problems with 
these models that came to light in the 
aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial crisis in-
dicate a need for a much more radical 
change in the way economic theory is 
done. I end by highlighting one ap-
proach that has the potential to bring 
about this change.
Standard Model
To understand how the behavioural ap-
proach is different, let me fi rst put down 
the basic framework in which standard 
(I will use “standard” instead of the 
more loaded term “neo-classical”) eco-
nomic models are constructed. This frame-
work is called “rational choice” and it 
assumes that individuals have prefer-
ences over all possible alternatives, and 
that they take actions within certain 
“constraints” (these could be fi nancial 
constraints or time constraints) to choose 
the most preferred alternative possible.2 
Preferences are assumed to be rational, 
implying that they satisfy some assump-
tions like “completeness,” which says that 
every possible outcome is included in the 
ordering of preferences, and “consistency,” 
among others. These assumptions are 
not based on observed behaviour but are 
axiomatic in nature, which means that 
they are assumed to be true within the 
model. The argument for using axiomatic 
assumptions is that if the model’s predic-
tions are close to reality, then it shows 
that people behave as if they have such 
preferences, and that is good enough for 
the purpose of economic analysis.
Under such assumptions, the prefer-
ences can be depicted by a function that 
maps each outcome, whether it is wealth 
or a state of the world, on to a number, 
with a higher number indicating a more 
preferred outcome. This number is called 
“utility” and the mapping function is 
called the “utility function.” The entire 
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process of choosing the most preferred 
alternative within the given constraints 
can then mathematically be modelled 
as a constrained maximisation of the 
utility function.
Behavioural Approach
The behavioural approach departs from 
this standard model by pointing out 
situations where models built on these 
axiomatic assumptions fail to predict 
reality and, hence, makes a case for using 
a behavioural basis for constructing 
economic models. This is, perhaps, best 
understood by looking at the anatomy 
of a typical research paper that uses 
this approach. The paper generally begins 
with a critique. It presents data, experi-
mental or otherwise, to show that the 
predictions of the standard model of 
economic decision-making are violated 
systematically, that is, the deviations 
from the predictions do not refl ect 
just random noise, but show a consist-
ent departure from the model in one 
particular direction.
A good example of this comes from 
one of the fi rst papers to use this ap-
proach by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
A group of experimental subjects is 
given 1,000 units each, and each of them 
is then asked to choose between two 
options:
(A) Get another 1,000 with 50% prob-
ability.
(B) Get another 500 for sure.
It was found that 84% of the subjects 
chose option B.
Another similar group is given 2,000 
units each and is given the following 
choice:
(C) Lose 1,000 with 50% probability.
(D) Lose 500 for sure.
Sixty-nine percent of the group chose 
option C.
As is clear from doing a little arith-
metic, the end results of options A 
and C, and those of options B and D, are 
identical. Yet, people systematically 
choose to treat them differently. This 
demonstrates two behavioural phenom-
ena called reference dependence and 
loss aversion. The standard model has 
no way of explaining this behaviour, 
as people are only concerned with the 
fi nal outcome. 
This and other such anomalies are not 
just academic curiosities as they have 
important implications for how we think 
about people taking economic decisions. 
For example, loss aversion will play an 
important role in a person’s investment 
in risky assets, where there is a chance of 
making a loss. Hence, the second part of 
most papers taking this approach presents 
an alternative model that explains such 
anomalous behaviour.
Typically, these models continue to use 
the constrained optimisation approach 
of the standard model while modifying 
one or more assumptions that take the 
form of additional parameters in the 
mathematical formulation of the model. 
The values of these parameters are then 
determined using experimental obser-
vations, thus yielding a model that fi ts 
observed behaviour much better than 
the standard model.
In this particular case, the authors 
replace the utility function with what 
they call a value function. Instead of 
mapping outcomes, that is, wealth, on 
to a number, this function maps gains 
or losses on to a number. This incorpo-
rates reference dependence. Also, the 
function is kinked at zero, so that it falls 
faster with losses than it rises with gains. 
This incorporates loss aversion. In a 
subsequent paper, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) estimate this loss aversion to be 
2.25, that is, the reduction in value be-
cause of a loss is 2.25 times more than 
the increase in value because of a gain 
of the same magnitude.
A similar pattern is seen in most areas 
where the behavioural approach has had 
an impact. For example, there is a large 
body of literature pointing out that, while 
preferences in the standard models typi-
cally refl ect only the individual’s own wealth 
or consumption, people actually care 
about fairness and equity and are altru-
istic (Thaler 1988; Fehr and Gächter 2000).
Models that incorporate these behav-
iours (Fehr and Schmidt 2004) just modi-
fy the utility function to refl ect social pref-
erences, that is, to include others’ con-
sumption, or to explicitly include a disu-
tility caused by inequality. Here, as in 
the previous case, the changes are minor, 
and constrained optimisation continues 
to be the underlying framework.3
Behavioural Non-revolution
Finance is one of the fi elds where be-
havioural models have been used exten-
sively, enough for “behavioural fi nance” 
to become a commonly used term. Behav-
ioural models in fi nance most often cri-
tique the effi cient market hypothesis, 
which states that if investors behave ra-
tionally then prices should refl ect all 
available information about the fi nancial 
asset in consideration. But, asset price 
bubbles and crashes belie this conclu-
sion. A number of behavioural models, in-
cluding feedback models where inves-
tors bid up the price on seeing other in-
vestors bidding up the price, have been 
used to explain these phenomena. This 
idea of “irrational exuberance” is now 
widely accepted and used in fi nancial 
analysis, especially while analysing as-
set price bubbles. Shiller’s and, to some 
extent, Thaler’s Nobel prizes were largely 
due to their contributions in this area.
While bubbles do occur in asset markets, 
for the most part, asset prices are such 
that it is hard for any investor to beat the 
market consistently. This implies that even 
when agents are “behavioural,” that is, 
they act not as assumed in the standard 
model, but in a loss-averse and reference-
dependent manner, described earlier, 
they interact with each other to produce 
outcomes as if they were all behaving ra-
tionally. This is a common critique of the 
behavioural approach, which says that 
while there are anomalies, for the most 
part, market outcomes are as predicted 
by the standard model. Behaviours like 
reference dependence should lead to 
“money pumps” which fi rms can exploit 
to continuously extract surplus from in-
dividuals. But, such money pumps are not 
found in the real world (Bryan 2017). 
This is not so much a critique of the be-
havioural approach, as much as an ex-
planation for why the standard models 
are still widely used in economics.
As explained earlier, the behavioural 
approach does not depart from the 
standard models in any fundamental 
manner. Behavioural models are most 
often extensions of standard models, 
which enable them to explain certain 
anomalous behaviours are not ex-
plained by the standard models. But, 
these unexplained behaviours are the 
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exception and not the norm and, hence, 
the original standard models continue to 
be used widely. To expect an approach 
that makes such piecemeal changes to 
the standard to revolutionise the disci-
pline in a fundamental way is a mis-
placed expectation to begin with.
But, this is not to say that there are no 
problems with the way standard eco-
nomic models are constructed and used. 
Many of these problems were foreground-
ed in the aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial 
crises. These problems attain even more 
signifi cance when these models of indi-
vidual behaviour are aggregated up to 
micro-founded macroeconomic models 
and are used in macroeconomic policy-
making.4 Non-behavioural assumptions 
are part of the problem, but there are 
many other issues too.
Individuals form the basis of such 
models and individual preferences are 
assumed to be given, divorced from 
any societal context, thus disregarding 
channels through which the society 
affects individual behaviour by changing 
individual motivations. While aggregat-
ing individuals’ behaviour, very often all 
individuals are assumed to be homoge-
neous, using what is called the “represent-
ative agent” assumption. This is most 
often done for mathematical tractability, 
but by doing this the model fails to in-
corporate phenomena that could emerge 
because of interactions between hetero-
geneous agents. And, fi nally, the idea of 
equilibrium is a key feature of standard 
economic analysis, whereas most of the 
time the economy is out of equilibrium. 
It may be the case that studying equilib-
rium conditions is not very useful for ex-
plaining non-equilibrium situations. 
None of these issues are addressed by 
the behavioural approach, rather they 
continue to be true of most behavioural 
models. In recent years, some alternative 
approaches have emerged that could 
potentially address some or all of these 
issues. One such approach seeks to con-
tinue the work started by Simon.5 
Computational Approach
Simon was one of the fi rst persons to 
bring insights from psychology into eco-
nomics. He questioned the reliance on 
constrained optimisation as a model for 
decision-making by pointing out that the 
processes of fi nding alternatives as well 
as of computing the optimal one are both 
costly. Simon (1972) described decision-
making under these constraints as 
“bounded rationality” and argued that, 
instead of modelling individuals as max-
imising utility, it is better to think of 
them as using simpler heuristics that en-
able them to meet a minimum aspiration 
level. He made substantial progress in 
simulating such decision-making behav-
iour using computers and, along with the 
economics Nobel, he was also awarded 
the Turing Award prize, one of the highest 
honours in computer science.
Simon’s insights are being operation-
alised today by a computational method 
called Agent-based Modelling,6 which 
models the economy as a complex sys-
tem consisting of heterogeneous indi-
viduals who interact with each other 
and are embedded in a social network 
that in turn affects each individual’s 
behaviour. Each agent behaves according 
to some simple heuristic, and aggregate 
outcomes emerge from the complex 
interactions between these agents. As 
computers are used to simulate these 
interactions, mathematical tractability 
is not a concern and, hence, there is no 
need for simplifying assumptions such 
as representative agents.
It is in such models that the insights of 
behavioural economics could end up 
having a greater impact, as they could 
(and do) inform the assumptions about 
how these agents behave and interact 
with each other within these simula-
tions, some of which have grown large 
and complex enough to mimic the size of 
actual economies (Axtell 2016). This is 
not to claim that the computational ap-
proach or complexity economics will 
“save the world,” but to point out that 
there is a need and an opportunity today 
to explore multiple approaches to eco-
nomics, with an open mind, in order to 
take the discipline forward.
Notes
1  The term “behavioural economics” itself is some-
what of a misnomer as it does not form a distinct 
subfi eld like fi nancial economics or labour eco-
nomics, and is rather just a modelling approach 
that modifi es the existing neoclassical economic 
models used in these subfi elds by bringing in 
psychological insights about human behaviour.
2  Beliefs also play an important role, but we will 
ignore that for the present discussion.
3  The same is the case with models dealing with 
uncertainty (prospect theory), or inter-tempo-
ral choice (hyperbolic discounting). For a de-
tailed survey of behavioural models, see 
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004).
4  The Reserve Bank of India, in its latest Monetary 
Policy Report (October 2017) has said that it in-
tends to use the benchmark model of this kind: 
a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
model, for forecasting and policymaking.
5  There are many other alternative approaches, 
including ones that revert to classical economics, 
which was behavioural by design. See Camerer 
(2005) for quotes from Adam Smith, where he 
describes what have come to be known as loss 
aversion and endowment effect.
6  For a detailed description of  Agent-based Model-
ling in economics and arguments for further-
ing this approach, see Farmer and Foley (2009).
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